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Abstract—Vote counting accuracy has become a well-
known issue in the vote collection process. Digital image
processing techniques can be incorporated in the analysis
of printed election ballots. Current image processing
techniques in the vote collection process are heavily
dependent on the anticipated, geometric positioning of
the vote. These techniques don’t account for markings
made outside of the requested field of input. Using
various form dropout techniques, however, every mark
on the form can be extracted and used by the machine
to make an intelligent decision. Most methods will still
miss a few marks and result in a few false alarms.
This paper explores methods of voting between the
results of the different mark extraction methods to
improve recognition. To provide diversity a simple image
subtraction technique is paired with a distance transform
and a morphology based algorithm. The result has a
higher detection rate and a lower false alarm rate.
Keywords- mark detection, combination techniques,
form dropout.
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of paper ballots can provide indepen-
dent auditing capabilities to elections, however
they do not, guarantee fair, verifiable, fast and
efficient elections. The Security and Transparency
Subcommittee for the Technical Guidelines De-
velopment Committee of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) observes
in a draft report on Voluntary Voting Systems
Guidelines for 2007 [1] that the use of paper
to provide independent auditing capabilities in
elections is entirely practical, but that there are
undeniably open technical issues that can and
should be addressed.
Early ballot-readers used optical mark recogni-
tion (OMR) and mark-sense readers with discrete
photocells. Here marks were expected and sensed
solely in discrete locations, and their presence de-
termined by the response in those discrete regions
exceeding a threshold. Although virtually all ballot
readers now use optical scanners with CCD or
CMOS arrays, many ballot scanners still simply
mimic OMR.
Work by Nagy et al. [2] has found ways to
reliably determine the locations of the target ovals
assuming the form was designed for reading on a
fixed grid OMR system. This can find the ovals
and the marks if they can be identified, but often
the voter will erroneously choose to mark the form
in locations other than in the ovals and knowledge
of the target locations will not help in finding these
marks.
While the instructions provided to voters are
usually a variant on “To vote, completely fill in the
oval(s) next to your choice(s) like this: ”, in the
United States the legal definition of a vote is based
on voter intent and thus marks that do not precisely
follow the instructions, either by varying the mark
shape, fill ratio, marking instrument darkness, or
mark position may still be valid and need to be
identified and analyzed.
In [3] and [4] some simple methods of locating
marks on ballots were explored, first on synthetic
ballots, then on ballots printed and scanned. Four
mark detection methods involving subtraction of
a blank ballot image from a filled-in ballot image
were explored. As expected, not all marks were
detected, and marks categorized as false alarms
were detected; at lower thresholds more marks
were detected but so were more false alarms, and
the opposite at higher thresholds. Ballots that were
scanned at a lower contrast/brightness setting,
thus appearing ‘darker’ had more image noise
to contend with than those scanned at a brighter
or ‘lighter’ setting. The best results achieved for
detection was 89% on the ‘dark’ ballots and 94%
on the ‘light’ ballots, however the associated false
alarm rates were 107 and 102 per page, respec-
tively.
This paper explores the benefit of running mul-
tiple mark detection methods and then voting
on the results to increase detection rates while
decreasing false alarm rates. Three methods of
form removal have been explored. The first is the
best performing Image Subtraction method from
the earlier work [4], the second is based on a
Distance Transform [5] and the third is based on
a Morphological Transform [6].
Section II describes the three form removal
methods that are being applied to the ballot read-
ing problem. Section III describes the voting pro-
cedures. Experiments and results to test their effi-
cacy are described in Section IV. The conclusions
are portrayed in Section V.
II. FORM REMOVAL METHODS
The preprinted form information can, in theory,
be removed from a filled in form by aligning the
two images and performing an image difference.
Problems result from imperfections in the image
alignment and variations in the image printing and
sampling which cause the template form and the
filled-in forms to differ by more than just the
added marks. Three methods that address this are
described next.
A. Image Subraction
In prior work [3][4] four methods of taking the
difference between a template and a marked ballot
image were presented. These methods alternately
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 1. (a) Original image (b) Difference image before thresh-
olding, (c) Difference image after thresholding.
took the raw images, or a smoothed version of
the image, then calculated the absolute difference
and either returned that raw difference or the
smoothed version of it. It was determined that if
the ballot images came from gray level scans, that
performance was greater if prior to differencing,
the images were thresholded, rather than taking the
difference of gray scale images and thresholding
the result. For this paper, the Otsu threshold is
applied. Depending on the thresholding technique,
the recognition rate ranged from 56% to 94%,
and the average number of false alarms per page
ranged from less than 1 to 186. As expected,
the higher detection rates were usually accom-
panied by the higher false alarm rates. The best
performing of the 4 variations came from taking
the convolution of both the thresholded template
image and the thresholded filled image, then tak-
ing the absolute difference, and smoothing that
result to reduce noise, Figure 1b. The smoothing
in both cases was done with a 3x3 uniform kernel.
This difference image is then thresholded again to
determine what content is considered as a mark




Figure 2. (a) Example Distance Transform. Lighter values indicate
higher distance. (b) Unsafe regions shown in black. (c) Original
marked ballot. (d) Extracted marks.
B. Distance Transform
The distance transform form removal method
[5] is based on evaluating how far pixels in the
image are from known text or rulings on the tem-
plate form. To compensate for the inexact match
between the edges in the aligned forms, safe and
unsafe regions are defined in the scanned template.
The scanned gray scale image is converted to
black and white by using a global threshold (Otsu),
as in Method 1, and from this the distance trans-
form (DT) is calculated [7]. The DT calculates
the distance from each pixel to the nearest black
pixel, Figure 2a. Pixels that are within a certain
distance from the black pixels in the blank form
are considered ’unsafe,’ while those further away
are considered ‘safe,’ Figure 2b.
This algorithm extrapolates from the pixels on
the border between the safe and unsafe regions to
find the rest of the filled-in data. Using information
gained from taking the gradient of the DT image,
the un-safe region is searched in the gradient
direction for black pixels which are used to redraw
the user entered data where previously a form line
was drawn. Figure 2d shows a portion of the final
image after this algorithm is complete.
C. Morphological Subtraction
The Morphological Transform technique [6]
was originally developed to extract handwritten
information on bank checks. It was assumed that
the filled check content differed from the blank
only in specific areas and that the difference would
be the data entered by the user. It also assumed that
there could be some difference between the tem-
plate and the filled check images, and this method
was designed to take these minor variations into
account.
The first step in the morphological transform
method is to subtract the template from the filled-
in form, Figure 3a,b. An erode operation with
a 3x3 ‘plus’ shaped structuring element (SE) is
applied to get rid of the pepper noise, Figure 3c.
To remove any additional noise and to help
further clean up the image a closing operation is
performed with a circular SE with diameter 26,
Figure 3d, which is followed by subtracting the
filled-in form from the current image. Finally a
logical AND operation is performed between the
image resulting and the simple subtraction image
to obtain the final image, Figure 3e.
III. VOTING
In OCR the results of post processing tech-
niques can be used to reduce the error rate, but
in mark detection that same procedure can not
be used because the location and contents of the
voter’s additions is unknown. In theory it will be
limited to filling in targets reducing the problem
to an OMR problem, but in reality that is not
the case. Using an ensemble of classifiers for
a pattern recognition problem can improve the
performance of the total system [8]. The main
issues are to choose the ensemble classifiers and
to determine how to combine the results. Ideally
the classifiers will have uncorrelated errors. This
is accomplished through diversity. In the mark
detection application, similar requirements exist.
The form removal methods described in Section
II were chosen because they have different ap-
proaches and thus increase the diversity.
The combination of the results takes a different




Figure 3. Examples from Morphological Form Removal. (a)
Original and (b) raw difference image. Result of (c) erode with
a ‘+’, (d) close with circle. (e) Final Image.
pattern recognition in that the number of classes
is no longer restricted to a small discrete set. The
detected mark size, shape and position can vary
considerably, and interpreting whether the marks
detected by competing algorithms match or not
involves more than checking whether the class is
an ‘a’, ‘b’ or ‘c’. If all the marks detected by
each method had the same shape, size and relative
positions, but a random subset of the union of all
marks was chosen by each algorithm, then the
voting would resemble the voting in traditional
pattern recognition. In mark detection, the marks
have different shapes and sizes in addition to a
‘random’ decision to be detected or not. Thus
when trying to decide if a mark has been detected
by multiple algorithms, how to count the multiple
detections becomes an issue.
A variety of methods were considered for the
voting method. Voting methods included looking
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. If the same mark is detected, but in offset positions,
there may be (a) no detection (b) or multiple detections after voting.
at whether the detected marks overlap in a ‘raw’
state such that pixels were labeled as marks by
two of the three methods. As the shape of the
detected marks could be irregular due to border
noise, it is possible that different parts of the same
mark would be detected by the different detection
algorithms. In that case the raw ‘on’ pixels would
not contribute to the vote correctly causing a miss,
or they could create multiple disjoint detected
marks in a close vicinity of each other, Figure 4.
Therefore different voting methods were explored
to see which would give better net results.
A raw count of which pixels in an image were
classified by 2 or more of the three form removal
methods was the base voting scheme. A valid mark
(whether a true vote or a false alarm) was defined
in [3] and [4] to be a connected component of
size greater than 2x2 pixels. This was defined to
reduce false alarms from small noise occurrences.
The mark shape that remains after raw summing of
the images could also have connected components
less than 2x2 in size, even if marks were found in
the same relative location on the ballot. Voting
both with the original image and with the small
connected components removed was evaluated.
To reduce the effects of edge noise on the
detected marks, each of the results from Methods
1-3 was then dilated and then votes on them
were taken. Structuring elements of square sizes
3x3 and 5x5 were used. This produced 8 voting
options.
A ninth voting method considered whether the
center of masses of the connected components de-
tected by multiple methods were within a specified
distance. Defining the centers of the connected
component as the average of the extents produced
the tenth voting method.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Experiments were conducted using form images
generated by the BallotTool [9]. Five pages of
ballot images were created. While the goal is to
be able to identify marks added by a voter in
any location on the ballot, not just in the target
regions, the marks in these ballot samples are
limited to the target regions, which only affects the
experiments in increasing the proximity of form
content to the added marks. Each page had 60
marks, with a mixture of filled ovals, check marks,
x-marks and dots. All of these marks have been
observed in the Minnesota 2008 senatorial race
ballot set [10]. The positioning of these marks
relative to the target center varied, as did their size,
darkness (gray level) and rotation angle. These
were printed and scanned twice each, once with
a high brightness setting, and once with a low
brightness setting, forming two subsets ‘light’ and
‘dark’. The blank ballot template page was also
scanned at both brightness settings. The scanned
area that lies outside the paper boundaries was
removed.
The template image and the test image were
aligned by roughly estimating the relative angle,
scale and translation with down-sampled versions
of the images using a Fourier Mellin phase-based
correlation technique [11] for scale and skew.
This was followed by extracting the target oval
positions in both the template and the marked
ballot images, using the initial angle, scale and
translation estimate to get mark correspondence
and estimating the linear conformal spatial trans-
formation. This was applied to the template image
to align it with the marked image as to not further
distort the markings made by the voter.
To create bilevel images, a global threshold with
the Otsu threshold was applied to both the blank
form template and the marked ballots. The three
form removal methods were each applied to the
10 form images.
The 10 variations on voting methods described
in Section III were applied to the three outcomes
for each form. An example of the marks detected
before and after voting is shown in Figure 5. Of
the 10 voting schemes tried, the best performance
was from taking the raw detected mark, prior to
2x2 size limiting, dilating that by a 5x5 square
SE, and forming the final image based on pixels
now turned ‘on’ in two or more of the three form
removal algorithms.
Initially the three mark detection algorithms
were tuned to be rather conservative on detection
to reduce the false alarm rate significantly. The
detection rate decreased after voting in many of
these cases because at some pixel locations only
one mark detection algorithm detected a mark,
while in other places three algorithms detected
marks as desired. With the false alarm rate being
relatively small it was not noticeably affected.
Because the sensitivity to the false alarms would
be reduced if a voting scheme were implemented,
the final threshold in Method 1 was lowered to
increase its detection rate.
Table I shows the detection and false alarm
results for five different thresholds in Method 1.
Performance of mark detection is presented as
percentage of the marks detected (% det) and
average number of false alarms per page (# FA).
Voting does not always increase the detection rate
and decrease the false alarm rate at a specific
threshold, but for a given false alarm rate detection
increases, and for a given detection rate, false
alarms decrease.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this project is to produce field data,
after form dropout, which could be successfully
interpreted by a mark detection process. After im-
plementing these three methods of form removal,
we are trying to make a comparison to decide
which is most likely to work for a wide range
of possible mark styles for election ballots. Each
individual method was able to detect many marks,
but also with false alarms. The combination of the
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5. Individual results for 3 form dropout methods plus
the result after voting. Target locations are shown in green. Red
indicates positions of detected marks.
three methods was able to produce a combined
result that was better in both detection and false
alarm avoidance, not just moving to another point
along the precision/recall curve. Further gains
may be possible by varying the sensitivity of the
morphological and distance transform methods to
increase the range of inputs to the voting process.
Mark detection is a new application in the doc-
ument image processing field. The voting method
presented has applications to the form reading
fields from which methods have been taken to en-
hance this problem. In addition to helping increase
accuracy of mark detection, good voting methods
could help in more traditional document image
analysis techniques such as determining whether
to consider extracted data as text or extraneous
Table I
RESULTS ON ‘DARK’ AND ‘LIGHT’ SCANNED DATA. DETECTION
RATES AND FALSE ALARMS ARE SHOWN FOR A RANGE OF
THRESHOLDS FOR METHOD 1 ALONG WITH THE RESULTS FOR
METHODS 2 AND 3. THE VOTING RESULTS AFTER VOTING ARE
SHOWN AT THE SAME THRESHOLDS.
Dark
M1 M2 M3
thr 64 75 85 102 128 Dist Morph
% Det 93% 93% 89% 85% 66% 84% 50%
# FA 96.0 39.0 1.8 0.4 0 1.4 0
Voting
% Det 92% 92% 92% 91% 85%
# FA 2.2 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.2
Light
M1 M2 M3
thr 64 75 85 102 128 Dist Morph
% Det 73% 72% 70% 67% 60% 69% 52%
# FA 136.4 52.4 6 0.4 0.2 1.2 0
Voting
% Det 72% 72% 72% 71% 68%
# FA 1.8 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
noise when reading forms, increasing accuracy in
line removal applications, or maybe even simple
image binarization.
REFERENCES
[1] W. Burr, J. Kelsey, R. Peralta, and J. Wack, “Requiring
software independence in VVSG 2007: STS recom-
mendations for the TGDC,” Technical report, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, November 2006.
[2] George Nagy, Daniel Lopresti, Elisa H. Barney Smith,
Ziyan Wu, “Characterizing Challenged Minnesota Bal-
lots”, Procs. Document Recognition and Retrieval, San
Jose, SPIE, Vol. 7874, January 2011.
[3] Elisa H. Barney Smith, Daniel Lopresti, George Nagy,
“Ballot Mark Detection,” Proc. International Conference
on Pattern Recognition XIX, Tampa, FL, December
2008.
[4] Elisa H. Barney Smith, George Nagy, Daniel Lopresti,
“Mark Detection from Scanned Ballots,” Procs. Docu-
ment Recognition and Retrieval, San Jose, SPIE, Vol.
7242, January 2009.
[5] Jianchang Mao and K. Mohiuddin, “Form Dropout
Using Distance Transformation,” Proc. Int. Conf. on
Pattern Recognition, 1995, pp. 328-331.
[6] Yimei Ding, Furnitaka Kimura, Minoru Okada,
Malayappan Shridharb and John W. V. Miller, “Back-
ground removal for check processing using morphol-
ogy,” SPIE Two- and three-dimensional systems for
inspection, control, and metrology II, Vol. 5606, 2004,
pp. 19-26.
[7] Gunilla Borgefors, “Distance Transformations in Digital
Images,” Computer Vision, Graphics and Image Pro-
cessing, Vol 34, 1986, pp. 344-371.
[8] L. I. Kuncheva, Combining Pattern Classifiers, Wiley,
New Jersey, USA, 2004.
[9] Daniel Lopresti, George Nagy, Elisa H. Barney Smith,
“A Document Analysis System for Supporting Elec-
tronic Voting Research,” Procs. Document Analysis
Systems, Nara, Japan, September 2008, pp. 167-174.
[10] Elisa H. Barney Smith, Daniel Lopresti, George Nagy,
“Towards Improved Paper-based Election Technology,”
Proc. International Conference on Document Analysis
and Recogntion, Beijing, China, September 2011.
[11] B.Srinivasa Reddy and B.N. Chatterji. “An FFT-based
Technique for Translation, Rotation, and Scale-invariant
Image Registration,” IEEE Trans. Image Processing,
Vol. 3, August 1996, pp. 1266-1270.
